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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

]
Case No. 890372-CA

Plaintiff and Respondent,)
vs.

]

WAYNE S. WARDLE,

]
Priority No. 2

Defendant and Appellant.
REPLY BRIEF
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The
unsupported
Defendant

State's

alternative

fraud

theory

is completely

by any competent or persuasive evidence
was

prejudiced

by

cross-examination

and

and the
argument

calculated to establish his guilt under such a theory.
Furthermore, the Defendant was unfairly prejudiced in
cross-examination by innuendo which was calculated to destroy his
credibility.
Finally,

the

inadequacy

of

the

"reasonable

doubt"

instruction would have been substantially cured had the proposed
"reasonable alternative hypothesis" instruction been given and the
Defendant has preserved his right to appellate review of this issue
by exceptions taken in the trial court.

1

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS AS A RESULT OF
UNWARRANTED AND PREJUDICIAL ATTACKS UPON HIS
CHARACTER AND CREDIBILITY.
The State contends:

"Defendant's

claims of unfair

prejudice rest upon his misleading representation of the facts
presented at trial and his mischaracterization of the crossexamination about his finances as impeachment."

Resp. Br. at 8.

In addressing the issue involving the alternative fraud
theory, the State argues that the record contains competent and
persuasive evidence establishing that the Defendant's building "was
not worth more than $13,000."

Resp. Br. at 8.

The testimony to which the State refers follows:
A. [BY MR. JENSEN]
•

*

*

As far as the amount, the amount that was requested
by an independent agent that had coverage through
our company, he set the amount. I think it was
probably an excessive guess, because I think we
have a contractor that looked at it and said he
could have probably rebuilt the building back to
the condition it was in for less than half of what
the insurance was on the building.
Q. He could have rebuilt that particular building
for how much?
A. I think he mentioned right around $13,000.
[Emphasis added]
T. 148-149.
As a general rule, if hearsay evidence is admitted
without objection, it becomes competent evidence admissible for all
2

purposes. See generally, Annot. 79 A.L.R.2d 890, Section 3 (1961).
However, this

rule

"does

not operate

to make

objectionable

testimony conclusive proof of the matter asserted therein.

The

fact that it was hearsay does not prevent its use as proof so far
as it has probative value, but this is limited to the extent of
whatever rational persuasive power it may have." State v. Romero,
352 P.2d 781, 783 (N.M. 1960) (reversing a burglary conviction based
substantially upon hearsay which was admitted without objection).
In State v. McGann, 132 Ariz. 296, 645 P.2d 811 (1982),
the defendant appealed his conviction on four counts of forgery.
The only proof that certain signatures were unauthorized was
provided through hearsay. In reversing the conviction, the Arizona
Supreme Court held that where an essential element of the criminal
offense was established solely by hearsay evidence, the admission
of

the

hearsay

was

"fundamental

error"

requiring

reversal,

notwithstanding the fact that the hearsay had been admitted without
objection.
See also Glenn v. United States, (1959, CA6 Tenn.) 271
F.2d 880. Cf. Kilaore v. State. 25 Okl. Cr. 69, 219 P. 160 (1923)
(motion for directed verdict should have been granted where proof
of an essential element of the offense was merely hearsay).
Defendant concedes that trial counsel failed to interpose
any

objection

"contractor"

to

testimony

allegedly

regarding

estimated

as

what
the

some

undisclosed

"probable"

cost

of

replacing the building. This equivocal hearsay is, as a matter of
law, insufficient to support a prosecution on the alternative fraud
3

theory.
The mischief created by the introduction of this hearsay
was later compounded by the prosecutor's innuendo suggesting that
the statement regarding the cost of reconstructing the building had
been made by the Defendant himself:
Q. [BY MR. JONES] Is it true it only cost $13,000
to put a new building on the site where the old one
burned down?
A. [BY THE DEFENDANT] That isn't true.
Q. Did you ever tell Mic Jensen that?
A. What?
Q. That it only cost $13,000 to put up a new
building where the old one went down?
A. I think you misunderstood the conversation.
Q. I'm asking you, sir, did you ever tell him that?
A. I don't believe so.
T. 336.
After combing through the Proof of Loss Statement, the
State has come up with what it believes is further evidence of the
inflation of the insurance claim.
The Proof of Loss statement provided in the
appendix of the defendant's brief lists an estimate
of $544 for sheetrock for the office wall, yet,
prior to the firef there was no sheetrock on the
walls in the area of the office that burned (T.37,
87-88, 104). There was only thin wood paneling
with no sheetrock underneath (T.37).
Resp. Br. at 9.
This is a theory that was never approached by the
prosecutor at trial.

The State would have this Court speculate

concerning the relative cost of restoring the office area with
4

sheetrock walls and the cost of restoring the walls with wood
paneling and from that conjecture find a sufficient

basis

for

arguing the Defendant's guilt on the alternative fraud theory.
The State

concludes

that

the

foregoing

"evidence"

demonstrates the prosecutor's good faith in cross-examination and
argument which suggested that i t was a "cop-out" for the Defendant
to hire a public adjuster to evaluate his loss and criminal for him
to submit a Proof of Loss Statement without personally verifying
each item. 1
In c l o s i n g , the prosecutor argued:
He claims no knowledge about the proof of l o s s , which i s
troubling also.
Here's a man who submits a claim t o the
insurance company for $24,900.00, s i g n s i t on the bottom
saying i t ' s t r u e , correct and accurate, and y e t on t h e stand
yesterday he s a i d : I don't r e a l l y know t o o much about i t , I
hired a couple of public adjustors t o take care of t h e
situation.
Well,
don't
proof
money

t h a t in r e a l i t y i s a cop-out by the Defendant t o say I
know what the p o l i c y i s a l l about, I don't know what the
of l o s s i s a l l about, and y e t I'm going t o r e c e i v e t h a t
from the insurance company.

T. 371.
The State takes a similar position in its brief on appeal. Resp. Br.
at 10.
In fact, under cross-examination, the Defendant testified:
Q. [BY MR. JONES] And it's your testimony to the jury that you
didn't know anything at all about what went into the Proof of
Loss?
A. [BY THE DEFENDANT] No, I read it.
and Loss exactly.

I understand the Proof

Q. Not only did you read it, Mr. Wardie, you signed it?
A. That's correct.
Q. Acknowledging the contents of that Proof of Loss is true
and correct?
A. I believe that it is true and correct.
T. 333.

5

The State attempts to justify the destructive crossexamination on the subject of the Defendant's "financial interest."
A relevant inquiry would have directly approached the Defendant's
financial condition at the time of the fire.

Instead, the

prosecutor chose to paint the Defendant as dishonest in his
business dealings and in his denial of the prosecutor's specific
questions for which the jury would surely assume there existed a
good-faith basis.2
The State suggests that the impeaching character of the
inquiry should be disregarded and the prosecutor should not be
required to establish good faith in making the inquiry because the
evidence was
Defendant's

introduced
"financial

for the purpose of
interest"

and

impeachment of defendant's credibility."

"was

establishing the
not

sought

for

Resp. Br. at 13.

The State then suggests that the authorities cited by the
Defendant should be distinguished because the impeachment in the
instant case does not arise out of questioning involving prior
felony convictions.

Resp. Br. at 14-15.

Finally, the State attempts to downplay the impact of
this line of questioning and the prosecutor's failure to offer
rebuttal by pointing out that, in his closing argument, the
prosecutor conceded that he had failed to establish any evidence of
financial motive.

Resp. Br. at 13.

2,,

The prosecuting attorney may well be assumed to be a man of fair standing
before the jury; and they may well have thought that he would not have asked the
question unless he could have proved what it intimated if he had been allowed to
do so." People v. Wells, 100 Cal. 459, 462, 34 Pac. 1078, 1079 (1893).

6

State v. Singleton, 66 Ariz. 49, 182 P.2d 920 (1947), was
an appeal from a murder conviction.
defendant's

theory

of

self-defense

The "very heart" of the
lie

reputation for being a peaceable man.

in

establishing

his

On cross-examination, the

prosecutor asked the defendant three times whether or not he had
threatened a third party by the name of Menacey.
defendant denied it.

Three times the

The State contended that "this line of

questioning was not put to lay the foundation for impeachment, but
was designed to rebut defendant's claim of self defense and on that
basis was both admissible and proper."

182 P.2d at 929.

In

reversing the conviction, the Arizona Supreme Court stated;
[W]hen, as here, such questioning is raised and
then dropped with no further attempt on the part of
the State to prove its point, the aforementioned
"fishing expedition" having failed, we believe it
to be wholly improper and highly prejudicial. To
allow this sort of examination would be to allow
the imaginative and overzealous prosecutor to
concoct a damaging line of examination which could
leave with the jury the impression that defendant
was anything that the questions, by innuendo,
seemed to suggest.
If the questions were
persistent enough and cleverly enough framed, no
amount of denial on the part of a defendant would
be able to erase the impression in the mind of the
jury that the prosecutor actually had such facts at
hand and that probably there was some truth to the
insinuations.
182 P.2d at 930.
The condemnation of innuendo has never been limited to
situations where the tactic is used to imply the existence of a
prior

criminal

record.

See

ABA,

Code

of

Professional

Responsibility DR 7-106(C)(1); ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice

7

3-5.7(d);3 6 Wiamore, Evidence, Section 1808(2)(Chadbourn rev.
1976).
No trial lawyer could read pages 342 through 355 of the
transcript and conclude that the mischief introduced thereby was
remedied by the prosecutor's concession that he had failed to
establish a financial motive for the fire.
It has been said that cross-examination is the most
effective machine devised

for getting at the truth.

Cross-

examination by innuendo is the most effective machine devised for
creating the illusion of truth and the illusion of effective
impeachment.

The power of innuendo lies in deception.

suspicion and spawns skepticism.

It breeds

It cuts to the very core of a

defense based primarily upon the accused's credibility.
dangerous

tactic

which

has

no

place

in

It is a

Anglo-American

jurisprudence.
This was trial by innuendo, guilt by impeachment.
POINT II
DEFENDANT HAS NOT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO APPELLATE
REVIEW OF THE JURY INSTRUCTION ISSUES.
The S t a t e

acknowledges

that

the

Defendant

proposed

a

" r e a s o n a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e h y p o t h e s i s " i n s t r u c t i o n which t h e d i s t r i c t
court refused to give.

The S t a t e

further

acknowledges t h a t

the

3
" I t i s an improper t a c t i c for the prosecutor t o attempt t o communicate
impressions by innuendo through q u e s t i o n s t h a t would be t o the defendant's
advantage t o answer in t h e n e g a t i v e , for example, 'Have you ever been convicted
of t h e crime of robbery?' or 'Weren't you a member of t h e Communist p a r t y ? ' or
'Did you t e l l Mr. X t h a t . . . ? ' when t h e q u e s t i o n e r has no evidence t o support t h e
innuendo." Comment, ABA, Standards of Criminal J u s t i c e 3 - 5 . 7 .

8

Defendant took exception to the district court's refusal to give
the proposed instruction.

However, the State argues that the

Defendant has waived his right to a review of the adequacy of the
instructions given because trial counsel did not take exception to
the "reasonable doubt" instruction.
recognize

is

that

the

inadequacy

What the State fails to
of

the

"reasonable doubt"

instruction would have been substantially cured had the proposed
"reasonable alternative hypothesis" instruction been given.
The precise deficiency of which Defendant complains was
recognized by Justice Stewart in his dissenting opinion in State v.
Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1382 (Utah 1989):
Finally, I submit that it is inappropriate to
instruct that a reasonable doubt is not merely a
possibility, as the instruction in this case does.
Possibilities may or may not create doubt.
Depending on the circumstances, a possibility may
constitute a reasonable doubt.
Whether a
possibility is sufficient to create a reasonable
doubt depends upon the
likelihood
of the
possibility.
Certainly a fanciful or wholly
speculative possibility ought not to defeat proof
beyond reasonable doubt. But the instruction does
not make the point clear.
An instruction that a reasonable doubt must be a
"real, substantial doubt, and not one that is
merely possible or imaginary" has been held to be
erroneous because, in practical effect, it tends to
diminish the prosecutor's burden of proof by
implying that the prosecution need not obviate a
real or substantial doubt. [Citation omitted]
In my view, the trial court's instruction was
clearly erroneous and ought to be so declared.
In

Ireland

the

majority

affirmed

the

defendant's

conviction but noted:
We do acknowledge however, that the dissent's
criticisms of the "more weighty affairs of life"
9

language is justified and share Justice Stewart's
concern that the "possible or imaginary" language
might, by implication, be understood to diminish
the prosecutor's standard of proof. Therefore, in
our supervisory capacity, we direct the trial
courts to discontinue use of that language in their
instructions on the definition of reasonable doubt.
773 P.2d at 1380.
The

problems

discussed

in

Ireland

are

presented

foursquare by the exception that was taken in the trial court. In
the instant case, the Defendant does not claim personal knowledge
of all of the circumstances which led to the fire. He was left to
answer

the charges by declaring

his innocence

and proposing

possible explanations which incorporated the circumstances as he
understood them to be. Clearly the refusal to give the "reasonable
alternative hypothesis" instruction was error where the "reasonable
doubt" instruction suggested the inadequacy of a defense based upon
"possible" explanations for the origin of the fire.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the State's alternative
fraud

theory

is completely

persuasive evidence.

unsupported

by

any

competent

or

The Defendant was prejudiced by cross-

examination and argument calculated to establish his guilt under
such a theory.
Furthermore, the Defendant was unfairly prejudiced in
cross-examination by innuendo which was calculated to destroy his
credibility.
Finallyf

the

inadequacy
10

of

the

"reasonable

doubt"

instruction would have been substantially cured had the proposed
•".rertFi >ntibJ *•* -jlt-pinH M,M • hypothesis" instruction been given and * • *Defendant has preserved his right to appellate review

-:

by exceptions taken in i;he ii'idi cumin .
II

is

r e s f i e c t I in 1 I «;

.11

convictions should be reversed and •

,

Defendant's

:ase remanded for a new

trial.
DATVD lliih AiltA

c

February, 1990.

N
Gary W.

Pendleton
Attorney for Defendant and
Appellant
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